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I.

INTRODUCTION

In February 2011, newly elected Governor of Wisconsin, Scott
Walker, introduced his Budget Repair Plan, a draconian set of
measures designed to strip most public-sector workers in the state
of the power to bargain collectively over the terms and conditions
1
of their employment. That act touched off weeks of unrest at the
2
state capitol, culminating in a 100,000 person protest. Democratic
legislators fled the state, hoping to prevent the quorum needed in
3
the legislature to pass the bill. The measure eventually passed, but
4
much of it remains tied up in litigation. Meanwhile, angry voters
recalled the governor—only the third time in U.S. history the
5
voters of a state have recalled a governor —but Walker, backed by
6
wealthy interests inside and outside Wisconsin, survived the recall
vote.

1. Bill Glauber, Dave Umhoefer & Lee Bergquist, Budget Confrontation
Rocked the State—and Beyond, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 4, 2011, http://
www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/123172373.html.
2. James B. Kelleher, Up to 100,000 Protest Wisconsin Law Curbing Unions,
REUTERS, Mar. 12, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/13
/usa-wisconsin-idUSN1227540420110313.
3. Glauber et al., supra note 1.
4. Steven Greenhouse, County Judge Strikes Down Some Restrictions on Public
Unions in Wisconsin Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012
/09/15/us/judge-strikes-parts-of-wisconsin-union-law.html.
5. Recall of State Officials, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org
/legislatures-elections/elections/recall-of-state-officials.aspx (last visited Jan. 18,
2013). In 1921, Lynn Frazier of North Dakota was the first governor to be
recalled; a dispute over state-owned industries led to his downfall. North Dakota
Gubernatorial Recall Election, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North
_Dakota_gubernatorial_recall_election (last updated June 21, 2012, 6:59 PM). In
2003, California voters recalled Governor Gray Davis amid that state’s energy and
budget crises.
California Gubernatorial Recall Election, WIKIPEDIA, http://en
.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_gubernatorial_recall_election (last updated Nov.
25, 2012, 10:17 PM).
6. David Horsey, Billionaires Buy Wisconsin Recall Election for Scott Walker, L.A.
TIMES, June 7, 2012, http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/topoftheticket/la-na
-tt-billionaires-buy-wisconsin-20120606,0,7775507.story. Two-thirds of the $31
million Walker raised to beat back the recall effort came from out-of-state donors;
Walker outspent his challenger by 7-to-1. Id.
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The pitched battle over public-sector union rights in
Wisconsin was but one lightning strike in a storm that has been
brewing across the United States. Since the 1990s, and intensifying
sharply in the last five years, public employees and their unions
have endured a pummeling from state legislatures, governors,
pundits—and even the U.S. Supreme Court. While lawmakers
around the country are rescinding collective bargaining rights for
many public workers, the Court has issued a series of opinions that
make it increasingly difficult for public-sector workers and their
unions to engage in political activity—and to stand up to those
attacks on their very existence. Most recently, in Knox v. Service
7
Employees International Union Local 1000, the Court seized upon an
opportunity presented by a narrow administrative question to
impose new and unprecedented limitations upon the political
speech of public-sector workers’ unions.
This note begins with a brief history of unionism in the public
sector in the United States, including the competing ideologies
undergirding the debate over public-sector union rights. It
describes the recent backlash against public-sector workers and
their unions, providing the context within which the Supreme
Court’s recent decisions are situated.
Then, it traces the
development of the Court’s public-sector labor jurisprudence
through five key cases dealing with public-sector unions’ political
activity, ending with the 2012 case Knox v. Service Employees
International Union Local 1000. Knox, I argue, portends a grim
future for public-sector unionism in the United States.
II. HISTORY OF PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES
A.

Origins and Growth of Public-Sector Unions

While organized craft unions in the private sector date back to
8
the mid-nineteenth century, major federal legislation granting
workers the right to organize and bargain collectively left out
9
public employees. As a result, public-sector unionism was “virtually
7.
8.

132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
See generally RICHARD O. BOYER & HERBERT M. MORAIS, LABOR’S UNTOLD
STORY (1955); PRISCILLA MUROLO & A.B. CHITTY, FROM THE FOLKS WHO BROUGHT
YOU THE WEEKEND (2001).
9. The 1935 National Labor Relations Act (also known as the Wagner Act),
which granted private-sector workers the right to form unions and bargain
collectively with their employers, explicitly excluded public employers from its
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nonexistent” in the United States until the 1960s.
In 1962,
however, President Kennedy signed Executive Order 10988, which
established union recognition procedures and granted limited
collective bargaining rights for federal employees in the executive
12
branch. Executive Order 10988 was hailed “as the Magna Carta
13
for federal-employee unionism.”
States followed the federal
government’s lead; the order accelerated the passage of state
legislation granting public employers at the state and local levels
14
the authority to bargain with associations of public employees. By
1980, forty-two states had authorized collective bargaining for at
15
least some categories of public employees.
Unionization among public employees grew exponentially in
the 1960s and 1970s. Between 1956 and 1978 membership in
16
public-sector unions increased 500 percent. By 1978, almost 40
17
percent of all public employees were represented by unions. The
coverage. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006) (“The term ‘employer’ includes any
person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not
include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any
Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof . . . .”); see also
Donald S. Wasserman, Collective Bargaining Rights in the Public Sector: Promises and
Reality, in JUSTICE ON THE JOB: PERSPECTIVES ON THE EROSION OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 57 (Richard N. Block et al. eds., 2006).
10. Wasserman, supra note 9, at 57.
11. Small groups of public workers had organized as early as the 1800s when
craftsmen employed in Navy shipyards joined unions. E. EDWARD HERMAN &
ALFRED KUHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR RELATIONS 85 (1981). In the
early 1900s, workers from the Government Printing Office and Postal Service
unionized, though these unions “functioned primarily as fraternal, social, craft, or
benevolent organizations.” Id. at 85–86.
12. Wasserman, supra note 9, at 58.
13. HERMAN & KUHN, supra note 11, at 86.
14. Id. at 87. Many states patterned their collective bargaining statutes
closely after the federal law governing private-sector labor relations. The state laws
“mimicked the federal National Labor Relations Act so well that many have called
them ‘mini-Wagner Acts.’” Richard B. Freeman, What Can We Learn From the NLRA
to Create Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century?, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 327, 333
(2011).
15. HERMAN & KUHN, supra note 11, at 87 (“Thus, by 1980, 38 states and the
District of Columbia had collective bargaining statutes covering all or some
categories of public employees. In addition, in Arkansas and Virginia, attorney
general opinions authorize collective bargaining; in Illinois, state employees may
bargain under a 1973 executive order issued by the governor; in New Mexico, the
state personnel board has issued regulations authorizing collective bargaining.”).
16. HAROLD W. DAVEY, MARIO F. BOGNANNO & DAVID L. ESTENSON,
CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 371 (1982).
17. Id. at 373. There are a number of reasons for this explosion in publicsector unionism. First, “[p]ublic sector employment more than doubled between
1956 and 1978.” Id. Other reasons include:
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explosive growth of unionization in the public sector, however,
parallels a concurrent decline in private-sector unionization rates.
While the percentage of wage and salary workers in unions peaked
18
at 34.8% in 1954, overall union membership is now holding
19
steady at about 11.3%, with the public-sector union membership
rate (35.9%) more than five times higher than that of private-sector
20
workers (6.6%).
B.

Competing Ideologies

The dramatic increase in public-sector unionization
corresponded with growing acceptance of the legitimacy of public21
sector unions, followed by intense backlash since the 1990s,
22
demonstrated most vividly by the recent turmoil in Wisconsin.
This shift in acceptance of public-sector unionism reflects the
evolution of competing paradigms of public-sector labor relations.
The “traditional” ideological model of public-sector labor relations,
(1) removal of restrictive legislation by means of executive orders and
legislation at the federal level and collective bargaining statutes enacted
by 38 states; (2) awareness of a disadvantageous economic shift between
private and public employees; (3) acceptance of the institution of trade
unionism by public sector employees much as it has been accepted by
their private sector counterparts for several decades; (4) effectiveness of
confrontation tactics, with many of labor relations’ direct pressure tactics
modeled on those utilized by the civil rights movement in the early to
mid-sixties; (5) breakdown in and loss of respect for many forms of
authority; [and] (6) indifference of public agency officials to job-related
complaints or grievances which, in turn, led to employee frustration and
increasing receptiveness to union organizing attempts.
HERMAN & KUHN, supra note 11, at 87, 89.
18. GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32553, UNION MEMBERSHIP
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (2004), available at http://digitalcommons
.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&context=key_workplace. Note
also that virtually all of those union members in 1954 would have worked in the
private sector, because very few public-sector workers had the right to organize at
that time.
19. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—2012 (Jan.
23, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
20. Id.
21. See generally Neil Fox, PATCO and the Courts: Public Sector Labor Law as
Ideology, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 245; Martin H. Malin, The Legislative Upheaval in PublicSector Labor Law: A Search for Common Elements, 27 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 150–51
(2012).
22. After Governor Scott Walker proposed legislation in early 2011 that
would have stripped most state workers of their collective bargaining rights, tens of
thousands of people protested in the Wisconsin capitol for weeks. See generally
Todd A. DeMitchell & Martha Parker-Magagna, “A ‘Law’ Too Far?” The Wisconsin
Budget Repair Act: Point, 275 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2012).
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which prevailed until the 1960s, is hostile to collective action by
23
public workers. This model viewed unionism as “a threat to the
state’s sovereignty and to the government’s responsibility to reflect
24
popular will.” Under this model, a public-sector employer that
bargains with a union “gives up some of its power to decide public
25
matters, and to this extent, illegally delegates its power.”
26
In contrast, a “new” model of public-sector labor relations
developed in the 1960s that mirrored the industrial pluralism
27
framework dominant in the private sector at that time.
This
23. Fox, supra note 21, at 259.
24. Id. See generally Joseph E. Slater, The Court Does Not Know “What a Labor
Union Is”: How State Structures and Judicial (Mis)constructions Deformed Public Sector
Labor Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 981 (2000).
25. Fox, supra note 21, at 259; see also Malin, supra note 21, at 153. Malin
points out other common criticisms of public-sector collective bargaining, which
include (1) that bargaining distorts democracy by giving unions access to
decisionmakers that no other group enjoys; (2) that bargaining is not conducted
at arm’s length because the government officials want the union’s support in the
next election; and (3) that such bargaining leads to “bloated salaries and benefits,
excessive staffing levels, inefficient work rules, job security for poor performers,
the absence of merit in employment decisions, and the stifling of innovation in
the delivery of public services.” Id.
26. Note that Fox described this “new” ideology in 1985, shortly after the
1981 nationwide strike of air traffic controllers, which effectively ended when
President Reagan fired them all. Fox, supra note 21, at 261. Reagan’s sacking of
the air traffic controllers is widely recognized as a turning point in both publicand private-sector labor relations in the United States. See Joseph A. McCartin,
Unexpected Convergence: Values, Assumptions, and the Right to Strike in Public and Private
Sectors, 1945–2005, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 727, 728 (2009) (“Once Reagan permanently
replaced the striking members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Organization (PATCO) and showed that the public would support such an action,
a number of prominent private sector employers followed suit. In the 1980s,
Phelps-Dodge, Greyhound, International Paper, Hormel, and others imitated
Reagan’s example. The results were disastrous for labor.”). While Fox’s
characterization of this model of labor relations as “new” was apt in 1985, before
the effects of Reagan’s actions were fully felt, it is no longer new, and it appears to
be in decline.
27. See Fox, supra note 21, at 255. Following the Great Depression, the labor
unrest that accompanied it, and the subsequent enactment of the Wagner Act,
which recognized private-sector workers’ rights to form unions and bargain with
their employers, a new labor relations regime developed. “Industrial pluralism,”
as it was called,
reject[ed] the widespread hostility towards labor unionism that was
evident throughout judicial opinions from the early nineteenth century
until the 1930s. Instead of viewing unions as coercive restraints of trade
or as illegal criminal conspiracies, the industrial pluralists accept[ed],
indeed favor[ed], the growth of labor unions as a healthy sign of
capitalist economic development.
Id. Although the industrial pluralism framework enjoyed several decades as the
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model “acknowledge[d] that labor’s interests are legitimate, and
28
It
recognize[d] and protect[ed] workers’ rights to organize.”
regarded collective bargaining as “a therapeutic way for labor and
29
management to resolve differences as equals.” Statutory schemes
that were enacted under this paradigm required public employers
to negotiate with their employees over the terms and conditions of
their employment.
30
Professor Clyde Summers, in a series of articles, articulated
the practical and theoretical underpinnings of this “new”
31
paradigm.
Throughout these articles, Professor Summers
emphasizes two key points.
First, there are fundamental
differences between collective bargaining in the private sector and
collective bargaining in the public sector. Most importantly,
bargaining in the private sector is essentially an economic, marketdriven exercise, while bargaining in the public sector is a legislative
32
act. A negotiated contract in the public sector “is an instrument
of government and a product of government decision making” with
direct implications for the level of taxes the public will pay, while
private-sector bargaining solely concerns the interests of the two
parties across the table, with “little or no concern for the interest or
33
welfare of the public.”
Second, a built-in bias in our political system requires
34
collective bargaining for public workers. The political nature of
governmental decision making around terms and conditions of
public employment is not a reason to deny employees the right to

dominant ideological model of private-sector labor relations, it has waned in
recent decades. Id. at 256.
28. Id. at 262.
29. Id.
30. Professor Summers, according to one writer, was to union democracy law
what Louis Brandeis was to the field of privacy law. Michael J. Goldberg, Present at
the Creation: Clyde W. Summers and the Field of Union Democracy Law, 14 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 121, 121 (2010).
31. See Clyde W. Summers, Bargaining in the Government’s Business: Principles
and Politics, 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 265 (1987) [hereinafter Summers, Bargaining in the
Government’s Business]; Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political
Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974) [hereinafter Summers, A Political Perspective];
Clyde W. Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: A Different Animal, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 441 (2003) [hereinafter Summers, A Different Animal]; Clyde W. Summers,
Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 U. CIN. L. REV.
669 (1975) [hereinafter Summers, Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking].
32. Summers, Bargaining in the Government’s Business, supra note 31, at 266.
33. Summers, A Different Animal, supra note 31, at 442.
34. Summers, Bargaining in the Government’s Business, supra note 31, at 268.
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bargain collectively.
On the contrary, because government
employees are massively outnumbered by voters, who continually
demand more public services at a lower cost, public employees
need to speak with one voice through a union in order to offset this
35
political disadvantage.
C.

Backlash

Summers’s views and the “new” model of public-sector labor
relations enjoyed predominance through the 1980s. Since the
1990s, however, a fierce backlash against public-sector unions has
36
been brewing in state legislatures and the courts. Over the past
five years in particular, public workers have endured a vicious and
37
unprecedented attack not only on their wages and benefits, but
also on their right to bargain over the terms and conditions of their
38
employment.
The economic downturn that began in 2007
provided a convenient opportunity for right-wing politicians to pin
governments’ fiscal woes on so-called “pampered public sector
39
employees with high wages and benefits and high job security.”
While the connection between collective bargaining rights and
massive budget deficits is, at best, misguided and, at worst, sheer
40
pretext for union busting, states from New Jersey to Idaho have
nevertheless recently enacted laws restricting collective bargaining
41
rights for public employees. Common themes among these laws
35. Id.; see also Summers, A Political Perspective, supra note 31, at 1161 (“[T]he
fact that the economic interests of the voting public, both as taxpayers and as users
of public services, run directly counter to the economic interests of public
employees in wages and working conditions suggests that public employees may
need special procedures to insure that their interests receive adequate
consideration in the political process.”).
36. Malin, supra note 21, at 150–51. Despite a brief period of expansion of
public-employee-union rights in the early 2000s, the overall trend since the 1990s
has been a marked contraction of those rights. Id. at 151–52.
37. Joseph E. Slater, Public-Sector Labor in the Age of Obama, 87 IND. L.J. 189,
189 (2012).
38. Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt & Winston Lin, The Great Recession, the
Resulting Budget Shortfalls, the 2010 Elections and the Attack on Public Sector Collective
Bargaining in the United States, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 407, 411 (2012).
39. Id.
40. See Slater, supra note 37, at 202 (“[N]o significant correlation between
public-sector bargaining rights and state deficit levels has been shown. . . . [S]tates
that allow public-sector collective bargaining on average have a 14% deficit relative
to their budgets, while states that bar collective bargaining have 16.5% deficits.”).
41. See generally Malin, supra note 21. Malin’s analysis focuses on legislative
changes in twelve states. The National Conference of State Legislatures, which
tracks bills related to collective bargaining, found that there were 820 bills
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are: (1) limiting the scope of bargaining, most frequently taking
42
the topic of health insurance off the table; (2) changing impasse
resolution procedures to give public employers greater control over
43
the terms of employment; (3) giving governments the right to
renegotiate or rescind collective-bargaining agreements in times of
44
financial distress; and (4) repealing the right to bargain
45
Taken together, these changes may represent “the
altogether.
largest grab for economic and political power by the American
upper class since the destruction of the labor guilds in the 1890s
and the rise of the ‘Gilded Age’ in the late nineteenth and early
46
twentieth century.”
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S EVOLVING VIEW ON
PUBLIC-EMPLOYEE UNIONS
A.

Speech: The Key Issue

A key battleground in the fight over public-sector union rights,
and the focus of this note, is the right of unions to collect and
spend money for political purposes, particularly when

introduced in all fifty states and Puerto Rico in 2011 seeking to restrict or
eliminate collective bargaining rights of public workers. David Schaper, Collective
Bargaining Curbs Spread Across the U.S., NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 24, 2011, 3:27 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/05/24/136610879/collective-bargaining-curbs-spread
-across-the-u-s; see also R. Theodore Clark, Jr., Public Sector Collective Bargaining at the
Crossroads, 44 URB. LAW 185, 188 (2012) (“[I]n light of recent developments that
do not augur well for public sector collective bargaining, future labor scholars may
well look back on the last 50 years as ‘The Golden Age of Public Sector Collective
Bargaining.’ . . . While legislative enactments and the results of collective
bargaining have unquestionably favored public sector labor unions in the past half
century, there are significant signs that the tide is beginning to turn.”). For a
database of all public-employee-related bills introduced in 2011 and 2012, see
Collective Bargaining Legislation Database, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www
.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/collective-bargaining-legislation-database.aspx.
42. Malin, supra note 21, at 157 (“By far, the most numerous changes made
in the upheaval of 2011 concerned the scope of bargaining.”).
43. Id. at 160. Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, and Wisconsin amended impasse-resolution procedures. Id. at 160–63.
44. Id. at 163. Nevada and Michigan enacted “financial distress” provisions.
Id. at 163–64.
45. Id. at 154. Oklahoma and Tennessee repealed statutes that granted
public employees the right to bargain with their employers. Wisconsin effectively
ended collective bargaining for all public workers except law enforcement,
firefighters, and transit workers (if the denial of collective bargaining to transit
workers would result in the loss of federal transit money). Id. at 156.
46. Dau-Schmidt & Lin, supra note 38, at 408.
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47

nonmembers object to such payments. This question raises First
Amendment issues because payment of union dues is, in many
states, a condition of government employment. Mandatory dues
that are used for political speech represent a form of compelled
speech and present troubling First Amendment issues, with which
48
the Supreme Court has been wrestling for decades.
The Court’s jurisprudence in this area reflects the changing
public sentiment regarding public-sector unions. Its cases, starting
49
with Abood v. Detroit Board of Education in 1977 (in which the Court
approved of public-sector unionism generally and of agency-shop
agreements specifically) and ending most recently with Knox v.
50
Service Employees International Union Local 1000 (in which the Court
repudiated key precedent on its way toward forcing “right-to-work”
arrangements on all public employees), mirror the predominant
thinking of their times. While Abood is representative of the “new”
model of public-sector labor relations prevalent at its time, Knox
plainly reflects the anti-union backlash of recent years. An
examination of the key public-sector union dues cases leading up
to Knox shows this disturbing evolution in the Court’s
jurisprudence.
B.

International Association of Machinists v. Street: The
Foundational Case from the Private Sector

While not related to public-sector workers, the case
51
International Association of Machinists v. Street forms the basis for
much of the Court’s jurisprudence on public-sector-union matters.
47. A “nonmember” is a person who is covered by a union contract but is not
a full member of the union. The nonmember receives all the benefits of the
collective-bargaining agreement and union representation but may not participate
in the internal decision-making process of the union, such as electing officers and
ratifying contracts. In so-called “right-to-work” states, nonmembers may not be
compelled to contribute anything toward the cost of representation and collective
bargaining. In other states, the nonmember pays an “agency fee” or “fair share
fee” to cover the union’s costs related to bargaining and representation. See infra
note 109.
48. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233–34 (1977) (“Our
decisions establish with unmistakable clarity that the freedom of an individual to
associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. . . . Equally clear is the proposition that a
government may not require an individual to relinquish rights guaranteed him by
the First Amendment as a condition of public employment.” (citations omitted)).
49. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
50. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
51. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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In Street, a group of railroad workers objected to their union’s
collection and expenditure of dues money for political purposes.
Without reaching the objecting members’ constitutional
arguments, the Supreme Court nevertheless held that Congress,
through the Railway Labor Act, had not given unions the right to
collect money for political uses over the objection of members who
52
disagreed with the unions’ views.
Although the objecting members were entitled to some
remedy for the union’s improper collection of their dues for
political expenditures, the Supreme Court declined to fashion a
specific remedy for those workers. In instructions for the lower
court on remand, however, the Court established guidelines for the
remedy that should be applied. Noting that the majority of
members also had an interest in speaking on political matters
without being silenced by the minority of dissenters, the Court
urged lower courts to “select remedies which protect both interests
to the maximum extent possible without undue impingement of
53
one on the other.” Any such remedy, however, “would properly
be granted only to employees who have made known to the union
officials that they do not desire their funds to be used for political
54
causes to which they object.” The Court emphasized that “dissent
is not to be presumed—it must affirmatively be made known to the
55
By placing the burden of
union by the dissenting employee.”
objection upon the dissenting employee, the rights of both that
employee and the majority who wish to engage in political speech
56
are protected to the greatest degree possible.
This holding, that dissent is not to be presumed, surfaced in
the Court’s subsequent decisions on public-sector unions’ speech
rights, beginning with Abood in 1977 and ending with Knox in 2012.
While the early cases affirm Street’s holding, Knox leaves an open
question as to whether Street is still good law.
C.

Abood v. Detroit Board of Education: Birth of the Agency Shop for
Public-Sector Unions

The first Supreme Court case to deal with public-sector
unions’ ability to collect dues for political expenditures was the
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 750.
Id. at 773.
Id. at 774.
Id.
See id. at 773–74.
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57

1977 case Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, in which the Court
58
unanimously approved of agency-shop arrangements for public59
employee unions. After the State of Michigan enacted legislation
authorizing local units of government to bargain with unions
representing their employees, a group of teachers filed suit to
60
challenge the law.
The teachers argued, first, that public employment carries
certain constitutional guarantees not present in private-sector
employment, and second, that collective bargaining in the public
sector is inherently political, and for that reason it would violate
public employees’ rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to require them to financially support a union for any
61
purpose.
The Supreme Court rejected both arguments. First, the Court
62
borrowed the “familiar doctrine[]” from federal labor law, that
labor peace is best achieved through the principle of exclusive
63
representation. Exclusive representation, the Court noted, carries
many benefits.
The designation of a single representative avoids the
confusion that would result from attempting to enforce
two or more agreements specifying different terms and
conditions of employment.
It prevents inter-union
rivalries from creating dissension within the work force
57. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
58. See generally Robert C. Cloud, Commentary, Davenport v. Washington
Education Ass’n: Agency Shop & First Amendment Revisited, 224 EDUC. L. REP. 617,
619–20 (2007) (“[An agency shop is] one in which a union acts as an agent for all
employees, regardless of their union membership. In an agency shop, employees
are not required to join the union, but nonmembers do benefit from the union’s
collective bargaining efforts as much as those who are members. Consequently,
agency shop agreements entitle unions to levy service or ‘agency’ fees on
nonmembers.
The primary purpose of such agreements is to prevent
nonmembers from freeloading on the union’s collective bargaining efforts
without sharing the costs incurred in the process.” (citations omitted)).
59. The Court in Abood relied heavily upon Street, 367 U.S. 740. See supra Part
III.B.
60. Abood, 431 U.S. at 211–14.
61. Id. at 226–27.
62. Id. at 220.
63. Id. at 220–21. In the private sector, Congress established the principle of
exclusive representation in the National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (2006) (“Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment . . . .”).
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and eliminating the advantages to the employee of
collectivization. It also frees the employer from the
possibility of facing conflicting demands from different
unions, and permits the employer and a single union to
reach agreements and settlements that are not subject to
64
attack from rival labor organizations.
Although Congress left the regulation of state and local
government labor relations to the states, the Court reasoned that,
compared to the private sector, “[t]he desirability of labor peace is
65
no less important in the public sector.” Exclusive representation
does not violate the First Amendment rights of public employees
because they remain free to engage in the political process on their
66
own terms as well.
“[T]he principle of exclusivity cannot
constitutionally be used to muzzle a public employee who, like any
other citizen, might wish to express his view about governmental
67
decisions concerning labor relations.”
Therefore, states may
adopt the principle of exclusive union representation to achieve
the important governmental interest of labor peace, and public
64. Abood, 431 U.S. at 220–21; see also Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition
Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 63 (1975) (“National labor policy has been built on the
premise that by pooling their economic strength and acting through a labor
organization freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit
have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours,
and working conditions. The policy therefore extinguishes the individual
employee’s power to order his own relations with his employer and creates a
power vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests of all employees.
‘Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers
comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the
rights of those whom it represents . . . .’”) (quoting NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967)); Summers, Bargaining in the Government’s Business,
supra note 31, at 269 (“The principle of exclusive representation is considered
fundamental in our labor law. It approaches being the First Commandment with
the deification of the majority union . . . . But it is not written on stone from Sinai;
it has more practical origins. The historical purpose of exclusive representation
was to prevent an employer from playing one union against another to divide and
conquer, and its practical purpose was to establish a single contract with
standardized terms.”).
65. Abood, 431 U.S. at 224.
66. Id. at 230 (“A public employee who believes that a union representing
him is urging a course that is unwise as a matter of public policy is not barred from
expressing his viewpoint. Besides voting in accordance with his convictions, every
public employee is largely free to express his views, in public or private orally or in
writing. With some exceptions not pertinent here, public employees are free to
participate in the full range of political activities open to other citizens.” (citation
omitted)).
67. Id. at 230 (citing City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp’t
Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 174 (1976)).
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employees may be compelled to help pay for the cost of that
68
representation.
Requiring public employees to financially support a union’s
political and ideological activities, however, is a different story. The
Court stated:
Our decisions establish with unmistakable clarity that the
freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of
advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Equally clear is the proposition
that a government may not require an individual to
relinquish rights guaranteed him by the First Amendment
69
as a condition of public employment.
To require employees, as a condition of public employment, to
support particular political causes and candidates would
impermissibly infringe upon their rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, for “[i]f there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
70
act their faith therein.” Therefore, a union may “constitutionally
spend funds for the expression of political views, on behalf of
political candidates, or toward the advancement of other
ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining
representative” so long as those expenditures are not financed by
71
employees who object to advancing those ideas. In other words,
the Court divides union expenditures into two categories:
chargeable (those expenses incurred in the course of the union’s
duties to act as the exclusive collective bargaining agent for all
employees) and nonchargeable (those expenses not “germane” to
collective bargaining but spent “for the expression of political
views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement
72
of other ideological causes”). Unions may require nonmembers
to contribute toward the chargeable expenses, but not toward the
73
nonchargeable ones.
As for how to draw the line between chargeable and
68. Id. at 225–26.
69. Id. at 233–34 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 235 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943)).
71. Id. at 235–36.
72. Id. at 235.
73. See id.
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nonchargeable expenses, the Court found the record in Abood too
thin to justify rulemaking on that issue, and it left that question for
74
another day.
D.

Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson: Procedural
Safeguards for First Amendment Rights

The Court tackled the division of chargeable and
nonchargeable expenses in 1986 with the case Chicago Teachers
75
Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson. In that case, the Illinois General
Assembly in 1981 amended the school code to permit agency shop
76
agreements in union contracts. The following year, the Chicago
Teachers Union and Chicago Board of Education entered into an
agreement that permitted the union to collect “proportionate
77
share payments” from nonmembers, which amounted to ninety78
The union identified its
five percent of regular union dues.
expenditures unrelated to collective bargaining based on its
79
financial records for the previous fiscal year.
The union also
established a procedure by which nonmembers could lodge
80
objections to its calculations.
Four nonmembers objected to the proportionate share
deduction, bypassing the union’s internal objection process and
81
challenging the new procedure in court.
They raised three
objections to the union’s procedure: first, “it violated their First
Amendment rights to freedom of expression and association;
[second,] it violated their . . . due process rights [under the
Fourteenth Amendment]; and [third,] it permitted the use of their
82
proportionate share[] for impermissible purposes.” On appeal,
however, the nonmembers focused their attack on the procedures
83
used to calculate the amount of the proportionate share fee.

74. See id.
75. 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
76. Id. at 294–95. Prior to the amendment, union member teachers bore all
the expenses of collective bargaining and contract administration, while
nonmember teachers received the benefits of that representation without
contributing to the cost. Id. at 294.
77. Id. at 295.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 296.
81. Id. at 297.
82. Id. at 297–98.
83. Id. at 299.
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In its decision in Hudson, the Supreme Court recalled its
statement in Abood that “the objective must be to devise a way of
preventing compulsory subsidization of ideological activity by
employees who object thereto without restricting the Union’s
ability to require every employee to contribute to the cost of
84
collective-bargaining activities.”
“Procedural safeguards are
85
necessary to achieve this objective for two reasons.” First, while
the governmental interest in labor peace justifies the limited
intrusion on First Amendment rights that comes with the agency
shop, “the fact that those rights are protected by the First
Amendment requires that the procedure be carefully tailored to
86
minimize the infringement.”
Second, the nonmember who
objects to the political expenditures “must have a fair opportunity
to identify the impact of the governmental action on his interests
87
and to assert a meritorious First Amendment claim.” Therefore,
the Court held,
[T]he constitutional requirements for the Union’s
collection of agency fees include an adequate explanation
of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity
to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial
decision maker, and an escrow for the amounts
88
reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending.
So, while Abood approved of the agency shop in public employment
and distinguished between chargeable and nonchargeable
expenses, Hudson established procedural safeguards for
nonmember employees who object to supporting the union’s
political and ideological program.
E.

Davenport v. Washington Education Association: Cracks in
the Foundation

For twenty years, Hudson provided a workable framework
under which unions could collect and spend funds for political
activity from willing members while affording objecting
nonmembers an opportunity to opt out of those expenditures. In
89
the 2007 case Davenport v. Washington Education Association,
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 237 (1977).
Hudson, 475 U.S. at 303.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 310.
551 U.S. 177 (2007).
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however, the Court started to chip at the foundation it had laid
with Abood and Hudson, a foundation that, consistent with the
requirements of Street, delicately balanced the right of the union to
collect money for political speech with the First Amendment rights
of dissenting nonmembers.
In Davenport, voters in the State of Washington had approved a
comprehensive campaign finance reform law, which included a
provision prohibiting unions from using nonmembers’ dues and
fees for political expenditures unless the nonmember affirmatively
90
approved of that contribution.
Several nonmembers and the
State of Washington separately brought suit against the union,
claiming that the union was using nonmembers’ agency fees for
political purposes without their affirmative consent, in violation of
91
the law.
The Washington Supreme Court held that the law was
unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored to minimize
the impact on union members’ right to expressive activity while
92
protecting the rights of dissenting nonmembers.
The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed, holding that “given the unique context of
public-sector agency-shop arrangements, the content-based nature
of [the law] does not violate the First Amendment” for three
93
reasons.
First, the Court explained that the Washington Supreme Court
94
had interpreted the Court’s past cases on agency fees too broadly.
Those cases do not call for a balancing of the rights of dissenting
members against the rights of members, the Court explained, “for
the simple reason that unions have no constitutional entitlement to

90. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.760 (2006) (“A labor organization may not use
agency shop fees paid by an individual who is not a member of the organization to
make contributions or expenditures to influence an election or to operate a
political committee, unless affirmatively authorized by the individual.”)
(recodified at WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.500 (2012)).
91. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 183.
92. State ex rel. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n,
130 P.3d 352, 362–63 (Wash. 2006) (“We conclude that the union’s expressive
activity is significantly burdened by [the] opt-in requirement. We also conclude
that any compelling state interest in protecting dissenters’ rights, could be met by
less restrictive means other than the . . . opt-in procedure. The union’s Hudson
procedures amount to a constitutionally permissible alternative that adequately
protects both the union and dissenters. Because [the law] is not narrowly tailored,
we hold that the statute is unconstitutional.”).
93. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 190.
94. Id. at 185.
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95

the fees of nonmember-employees.”
The procedure for
protecting nonmembers’ rights as set out in Hudson is a floor, not a
ceiling. If a state wishes to require more than Hudson requires, it is
96
free to do so without triggering First Amendment scrutiny.
Second, even though the opt-in law was ostensibly part of a
package of campaign finance laws, the Court’s campaign finance
97
decisions were not on point. The union argued that the law was
unconstitutional because it imposed restrictions on how a union
may raise and spend funds that are lawfully within its possession.
The Court disagreed, noting:
For purposes of the First Amendment, it is entirely
immaterial that [Washington’s law] restricts a union’s use
of funds only after those funds are already within the
union’s lawful possession . . . . What matters is that publicsector agency fees are in the union’s possession only
because
Washington
and
its
union-contracting
government agencies have compelled their employees to
pay those fees. . . . As applied to public-sector unions,
[the law] is not fairly described as a restriction on how the
union can spend “its” money; it is a condition placed
upon the union’s extraordinary state entitlement to
98
acquire and spend other people’s money.
Finally, the Court rejected the union’s argument that the law
represented an impermissible content-based restriction on speech,
since it required affirmative consent for expenditures for political
speech but not for other kinds of speech. Conceding that content99
based restrictions on speech are presumptively invalid, the Court
nonetheless noted that the risk that government will use contentbased restrictions to interfere with the marketplace of ideas is not
100
present here.
The Washington law was a “reasonable, viewpointneutral limitation on the State’s general authorization allowing
public-sector unions to acquire and spend the money of

95. Id.
96. Id.; cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 237 (1977) (“[T]he
objective must be to devise a way of preventing compulsory subsidization of
ideological activity by employees who object thereto without restricting the
Union's ability to require every employee to contribute to the cost of collectivebargaining activities.”).
97. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 187.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 188 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992)).
100. Id.
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101

government employees.”
The law leaves unions free to
participate in the marketplace of ideas with funds that were not
102
raised from dissenting nonmembers.
What is remarkable about Davenport is not that the Supreme
Court upheld a state’s regulation of its public-sector unions, but the
way in which the Court began to describe public-sector labor
relations.
Whereas Abood extolled the virtues of exclusive
103
representation, the Court in Davenport came out swinging against
public-sector unions. After a brief description of the procedural
history, the Court declared that “[r]egardless of one’s views as to
the desirability of the agency-shop agreements, it is undeniably
unusual for a government agency to give a private entity the power,
104
in essence, to tax government employees.”
This statement
demonstrates a significant shift in the Court’s view of public-sector
105
unions.
While unions were once useful organizations that
fostered the important goal of labor peace and helped public
106
employees speak with one voice at the bargaining table, they were
now, in the Court’s view, simply private entities that possess the
107
“extraordinary” power to “tax” public employees.
F.

Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association: A Sharp Right Turn

Two years after Davenport, the Court upheld another state law
regulating public-sector agency fees in Ysursa v. Pocatello Education
108
Association.
In that case, the State of Idaho, which is a “right-to109
110
work” state, enacted a law eliminating “checkoff” for voluntary
101. Id. at 189.
102. Id. at 190.
103. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220, 224 (1977).
104. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 184 (citations omitted).
105. Note that the makeup of the Court changed almost entirely between
Hudson and Davenport. Justice Stevens is the only justice to hear both cases. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell,
Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor were replaced by Chief Justice Roberts, Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito. The Davenport court
contained all the current members of the right-wing bloc on the Court.
106. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 228 (“Through exercise of their political influence
as part of the electorate, the [public] employees have the opportunity to affect the
decisions of government representatives who sit on the other side of the
bargaining table.”).
107. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 184.
108. 555 U.S. 353 (2009).
109. “Right-to-work” is a term for state laws that forbid union security
agreements, or agreements which require membership in a union as a condition
of employment. The Taft-Hartley Act permits states to enact such laws for private-
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111

contributions to fund unions’ political activities.
The law, which
provided criminal sanctions for violations, applied to private
employers as well as to the state and political subdivisions of the
112
state.
Unions representing both private-sector and public-sector
employees challenged the law, claiming that it violated the First
113
and Fourteenth Amendments.
The unions argued that the ban
on checkoffs for political activities was an impermissible contentbased restriction on speech because the law banned checkoffs for
expenses to support political speech but not for any other category
114
of speech.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held the law
115
unconstitutional as it applied to the State as an employer.
Applying strict scrutiny, the appellate court held that the law was an
impermissible regulation of content-based speech for which the
116
State asserted no compelling justification.
sector workers. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2006). Some states similarly forbid union
security agreements for public-sector workers. In “right-to-work” states, union
members bear all the costs of collective bargaining and contract administration,
even though all workers who are covered by the contract benefit from the
collective bargaining agreement. Those who receive the benefits of union
representation without paying for it are known as “free riders.” See DAVEY ET AL.,
supra note 16, at 399.
110. “Checkoff” is an agreement by which an employer deducts union dues
and fees from employees’ wages and remits those amounts to the union. HERMAN
& KUHN, supra note 11, at 106. Unions highly value checkoff agreements, as they
save the union a great deal of time, effort, and money in its dues-collection duties.
See id.
111. Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 355–56.
112. Id. at 356. Violations of the law are punishable by a fine of up to $1000,
ninety days of imprisonment, or both. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 358.
115. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n v. Heideman, 504 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2007). The
district court held the law unconstitutional as applied to private employers and
political subdivisions of the state. Id. at 1056. The State did not appeal the ruling
as to private employers. Id.
116. Id. at 1056. Before applying strict scrutiny analysis, the court of appeals
examined whether forum analysis would be appropriate in this case. Id. at 1059–
68. Under a forum analysis, the State may draw content-based distinctions for
speech that occurs on government property that is a nonpublic forum. Id. at
1059–60. The appellants argued that forum analysis was appropriate because
payroll deduction programs of local governments are nonpublic fora of the state.
Id. at 1060. The court rejected that argument, however, because the State “failed
to establish that local governments’ payroll deduction programs involve Idaho’s
discretion and control over the management of its own internal affairs, such that
the programs should be considered a nonpublic forum of the State.” Id. at 1067
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The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, holding that the
State need not “affirmatively assist political speech by allowing
public employers to administer payroll deductions for political
117
activities.”
Idaho’s law did not abridge the unions’ freedom of
speech, according to the Court; it simply declined to use the statesponsored mechanism of the payroll deduction to promote the
118
unions’ speech.
Because the State had not infringed the unions’ First
Amendment rights, the Court applied rational basis review to the
119
law.
Relying on Davenport, in which the Court approved of
content-based distinctions for union speech, it found that “the
State’s interest in avoiding the reality or appearance of government
120
favoritism or entanglement with partisan politics” was sufficient
to justify the regulation, and that the ban on checkoff deductions
“plainly serves the State’s interest in separating public employment
121
from political activities.”
Further, the State may regulate the
payroll activities of local government units because those units are
“subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State
122
to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions.”
The State’s interest in separating governmental functions from
partisan politics “extends to all public employers at whatever level
123
of government.”
The majority opinion in Ysursa drew several pointed dissenting
opinions. Justice Breyer took issue with the majority’s position that
the statute did not interfere with the union’s rights under the First
124
Amendment.
Because a deduction system already existed, and
the union was not seeking to create a new system to aid in the
promotion of speech, the debate over whether the State’s action
was “abridging” speech or simply “declining to promote” speech
125
was “more metaphysical than practical.”
Nevertheless, Justice
Breyer would have found that there was a First Amendment right at
stake, and that the State’s ban on checkoff for political speech
(citation omitted). Therefore, the law was unconstitutional as to the political
subdivisions of the state. Id. at 1068.
117. Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 364.
118. Id. at 355.
119. Id. at 359.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 361.
122. Id. at 362 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964)).
123. Id. at 363.
124. Id. at 365–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 366.
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“affects speech, albeit indirectly, by restricting a channel through
126
which speech-supporting finance might flow.”
Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that strict scrutiny was
127
not the proper way to analyze this restriction on speech. Instead
of using rational basis review, he would ask a question the Court
has asked in other speech cases, namely “whether the statute
imposes a burden upon speech that is disproportionate in light of
128
the other interests the government seeks to achieve.” In line with
those cases, he would find Idaho’s statute constitutional if he were
convinced that the statute applied evenhandedly among similar
129
kinds of contributions.
But, because the law was so clearly
targeted against labor unions, it is not clear that it is evenhanded:
“A restriction that applies to the political activities of unions alone
would seem unlikely to further the government’s justifying
objective, namely providing the appearance of political
130
neutrality.” As such, the speech-related harm is disproportionate
to the government’s interest in maintaining the appearance of
131
neutrality.
Justice Stevens, also dissenting, was more direct: “Because it is
clear to me that the restriction [on checkoff deductions] was
intended to make it more difficult for unions to finance political
132
speech, I would hold it unconstitutional in all its applications.”
Justice Stevens identified two key features of the statute that belied
its purported viewpoint neutrality. First, the statutory context—the
statute pertained solely to labor unions—suggests that the
legislature intended specifically to hinder only unions’ ability to
133
raise funds for political speech.
Second, the law was both
substantially overinclusive and underinclusive with respect to the
134
State’s claimed interest in disavowing entanglement with politics;
it was overinclusive because it initially applied to private employers
135
as well as public employers, and it was underinclusive because it
136
failed to restrict payroll deductions for charitable purposes.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 367.
Id. at 366–67.
Id.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 369–70.
Id. at 370 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 371.
Id. at 371–72.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 371–72.
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Justice Souter similarly was troubled by the fact that “[u]nion
speech, and nothing else, seems to have been on the legislative
137
mind” when the State enacted the checkoff restriction. A reader
of the statute, he argued, “may fairly suspect that Idaho’s legislative
object was not efficient, clean government, but that unions’
political viewpoints were its target, selected out of all the politics
138
the State might filter from its public workplaces.”
Still, because
the unions did not directly raise the issue of viewpoint
discrimination, the Court could not have fully explored that
139
issue.
A court decision that ignores that “elephant in the room”
140
For that reason, Justice Souter
is one with limited authority.
argued, this case was a poor “vehicle to refine First Amendment
141
142
doctrine.” He would not have granted certiorari in this case.
While the Court demonstrated in Davenport that it would
uphold content-based state regulations of public-sector union
speech, it showed in Ysursa just how far it was willing to go in order
to do so. Idaho’s law did not just ban the use of payroll deduction
for checkoff for voluntary political contributions; it criminalized it.
It did not just apply to the state, but to all the political subdivisions
of the state. And the Supreme Court upheld that unduly harsh and
expansive law.
G.

Knox v. Service Employees International Union Local 1000:
The Beginning of the End for Public-Sector Unions?
1.

Background and Procedure

On June 13, 2005, then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
called for a special election to be held in November in which voters
would consider, among other things, two proposed ballot measures
that alarmed the union representing 95,000 public workers in
143
California,
Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”)
Local 1000. Proposition 75 “would have required unions to obtain
employees’ affirmative consent before charging them fees to be

137. Id. at 377 (Souter, J., dissenting).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 377–78.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 378.
142. Id.
143. About Local 1000, SEIU LOCAL 1000, http://seiu1000.org/your-union
/about.php (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
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144

used for political purposes.”
Proposition 76 “would have limited
state spending and would have given the Governor the ability
under some circumstances to reduce state appropriations for
145
public-employee compensation,” in effect giving the governor the
power to unilaterally abrogate duly-negotiated and ratified
contracts with the state’s public-employee unions.
SEIU Local 1000 had already sent out its annual Hudson
146
notice in early June 2005, before the Governor announced his
147
plans.
After the period for making Hudson objections expired,
148
instituted an
the union’s democratically-elected council
“Emergency Temporary Assessment to Build a Political Fight-Back
149
Fund,” which raised membership dues by one-quarter of one
150
This dues
percent (0.25%), from 1.0% of gross wages to 1.25%.
increase was intended to raise money to defeat Propositions 75 and
76 and to assist in the union’s political efforts in the 2006 general
151
election.
After receiving the notice of the dues increase, one of the
plaintiffs complained to the union that he had not been afforded
152
an opportunity to object to the special assessment. With the help
144. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2285 (2012).
145. Id.
146. A Hudson notice is part of the procedural due process requirement
under Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986). This
notice, which a public-sector union sends out to nonmembers, usually on an
annual or semi-annual basis, explains its calculation of chargeable and
nonchargeable expenses for the coming year and offers nonmembers an
opportunity to challenge that calculation and/or opt out of (object to) paying the
nonchargeable expenses. Id. at 310. An “objecting nonmember” is one who opts
out of paying the nonchargeable expenses and pays only for the expenses
germane to collective bargaining under Hudson. See id. at 292.
147. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2285. The Hudson notice explained that 56.35% of its
total expenditures in the coming year would be devoted to chargeable collective
bargaining activities and would constitute the fair share percentage of dues and
fees that would be charged to nonmembers in the coming year. Id.
148. Brief for Respondent, Knox, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (No. 10-1121), 2011 WL
5908951.
149. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2285.
150. Brief for Respondent, supra note 148, at *3. The union’s Hudson notice
included a statement that the agency fee was subject to increase at any time
without further notice. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2285.
151. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2285–86. According to the union’s proposal, the
Fight-Back Fund would be used “for a broad range of political expenses, including
television and radio advertising, direct mail, voter registration, voter education,
and get out the vote activities in our work sites and in our communities across
California.” Id. at 2286 (internal quotation marks omitted).
152. Id. at 2286.
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153

of the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, the
plaintiff filed a class-action suit on behalf of 28,000 nonmember
employees who contributed to the Fight-Back Fund, some who had
objected after the regular Hudson notice was sent, and some who
154
had never previously objected.
The district court granted summary judgment to the class of
155
156
nonmembers, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
Applying Hudson’s balancing test—“devis[ing] a way of preventing
compulsory subsidization of ideological activity by employees who
object thereto without restricting the Union’s ability to require
every employee to contribute to the cost of collective-bargaining
157
activities” —that court held that no second Hudson notice was
158
necessary after the mid-year increase was instituted.
First, according to the court of appeals, the chargeable and
nonchargeable dues calculations set out in Hudson notices, as a
159
matter of “practical necessity,”
lag one year behind actual
expenditures. Because Hudson requires that the union’s financial
statements be audited before being presented to members and
nonmembers, the union’s expenditures must have been made
before the chargeable portion can be calculated. “The audit
requirement renders impossible any method of determining the
chargeability of the upcoming fee year’s expenditures other than
basing it on the prior year’s actual expenditures, because one
160
cannot audit anticipated future expenditures.”
The “inevitable
161
effect” of such a requirement is that nonmembers’ fair-share fees
will fluctuate from year to year based on the prior year’s
expenditures, but “these over- and undercharges even out over
162
time.”
153. Id. at 2284; see also Press Release, Nat’l Right to Work Legal Def. Found.,
Inc., Federal Judge Blocks Unlawful Union Dues Seizures from State Government
Employees (Nov. 3, 2005), available at http://www.nrtw.org/en/press/2005/11
/federal-judge-blocks-unlawful-union-dues-seizures-state-government-employees.
154. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2286; Brief for Petitioners, Knox, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (No.
10-1121), 2011 WL 4100440 at *5.
155. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2286.
156. See Knox v. Cal. State Emps. Ass’n Local 1000, 628 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir.
2010).
157. Id. at 1119–20 (quoting Chi. Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475
U.S. 302 (1986)).
158. Id. at 1123.
159. Id. at 1121.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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Second, and related to the first point, unions’ chargeable and
nonchargeable expenses vary from year to year. A union might
negotiate a significant new contract in one year (the costs of which
would be attributable to collective bargaining expenses) and
engage in election year politics the next (which would generate a
great deal of nonchargeable expenses). Thus, “Hudson’s prior year
method assumes and accepts that a union has no ‘typical spending
regime,’ and that even though spending might vary dramatically, a
single annual notice based upon the prior year’s audited finances is
163
constitutionally sufficient.”
The union’s June 2005 Hudson
notice, then, was sufficient for the current year because the
temporary emergency dues increase would be accounted for in the
next year’s Hudson notice.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s
conclusion that it is incumbent upon the union to devise a system
that imposes the least possible burden on objecting
164
nonmembers.
The union’s obligation, the court stated, is “to
establish a system that merely ‘reasonably accommodates the
legitimate interests of the union, the [public employer] and
165
nonmember employees.’”
2.

The Supreme Court Decision

The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and
remanded, holding that “when a public-sector union imposes a
special assessment or dues increase, the union must provide a fresh
Hudson notice and may not exact any funds from nonmembers
166
without their affirmative consent.” In reaching that holding, the
Court examined issues of compelled speech and whether the
process for objecting properly protects nonmembers’ First

163. Id. at 1122.
164. Id. at 1122–23.
165. Id. at 1123 (quoting Grunwald v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist.,
994 F.2d 1370, 1376 n.7 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also Andrews v. Educ. Ass’n of
Cheshire, 829 F.2d 335, 340 (2d Cir. 1987) (“When the union’s plan satisfies the
standards established by Hudson, the plan should be upheld even if its opponents
can put forth some plausible alternative less restrictive of their right not to be
coerced to contribute funds to support political activities that they do not wish to
support.”).
166. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2296 (2012).
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor
concurred in the judgment. Justices Breyer and Kagan together dissented.
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167

Amendment rights.
First, the Court explored the inherent tension between
obligatory payment of union dues and the First Amendment.
Beginning from the proposition that “[t]he government may not
prohibit the dissemination of ideas that it disfavors, nor compel the
168
endorsement of ideas that it approves,” the Court noted that
union dues constitute a form of compelled speech, since payment
of dues—or at least payment of agency fees—is a condition of
169
employment for most public-sector workers. As such, union dues
represent a “‘significant impingement on First Amendment
170
rights’” because “a public-sector union takes many positions
during collective bargaining that have powerful political and civic
171
consequences,” positions with which nonmembers may disagree.
The Court observed that “[o]ur cases to date have tolerated this
‘impingement,’ and we do not revisit today whether the Court’s
former cases have given adequate recognition to the critical First
172
Amendment rights at stake.”
The Court then turned to the method by which objecting
nonmembers must make their objections known. By “historical
173
accident,” according to the Court, an “opt-out” system developed,
which requires nonmembers to declare affirmatively that they
object to paying dues and fees to support the union’s political
objectives; if they do not opt out, they are presumed to wish to
174
support the political program.
That approach, the Court said,
175
“represents a remarkable boon for unions,” because it puts the
burden of asserting First Amendment rights on the objecting
nonmember. “[W]hat is the justification for putting the burden on
the nonmember to opt out of making such a payment [to fund a
176
union’s political or ideological activities]?” the Court asked.
“Shouldn’t the default rule comport with the probable preferences
167. Id. at 2293–96.
168. Id. at 2288 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382
(1992)).
169. Id. at 2289.
170. Id. (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455
(1984)).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2290.
174. Id.; see Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 744 (1961); Abood
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 238–42 (1977).
175. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2290.
176. Id.
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177

of most nonmembers?”
Finding no justification, the Court, for
the first time, imposed an “opt-in” requirement for nonchargeable
expenses, making a dues objection the default position unless the
nonmember affirmatively opts in to paying such dues.
Then, the Court explained why a fresh Hudson notice for midyear dues increases is necessary in order to protect the First
Amendment rights of objecting nonmembers. In short, “Hudson
made it clear that any procedure for exacting fees from unwilling
contributors must be ‘carefully tailored to minimize the
178
infringement’ of free speech rights.” Informed choice is the key
179
An annual
to the Hudson notice system, the Court explained.
notice is only sufficient if it provides the nonmember with all the
information she needs in order to make a decision about whether
to object for the year. If the union makes a mid-year change in the
amount of dues that it will require nonmembers to pay, the
nonmembers could not have given informed consent to the new
180
payment.
Therefore, the union’s procedure for collecting fees
from nonmembers was not carefully tailored to minimize
181
impingement on nonmembers’ First Amendment rights.
The
Court concluded:
To respect the limits of the First Amendment, the union
should have sent out a new notice allowing nonmembers
to opt in to the special fee rather than requiring them to
opt out.
Our cases have tolerated a substantial
impingement on First Amendment rights by allowing
unions to impose an opt-out requirement at all. Even if
this burden can be justified during the collection of
regular dues on an annual basis, there is no way to justify
the additional burden of imposing yet another opt-out
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2291 (quoting Chi. Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475
U.S. 292, 303 (1986)).
179. Id. at 2291–92.
180. Id.
181. The Court rejected the union’s argument that an increase in dues for
political purposes in the current year would be offset by a decrease in chargeable
expenses in the following year. The later decrease “would not fully recompense
nonmembers who did not opt out after receiving the regular notice but would
have opted out if they had been permitted to do so when the special assessment
was announced.” Id. at 2292. Even a full refund “would not undo the violation of
First Amendment rights,” because “the First Amendment does not permit a union
to extract a loan from unwilling nonmembers even if the money is later paid back
in full.” Id. at 2292–93. A refund provided after the money had been spent for
political purposes would be “cold comfort.” Id. at 2293.
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requirement to collect special fees whenever the union
182
desires.
As a practical matter, the Court also took issue with the
union’s methods of defining and accounting for its expenditures.
While the union’s statements of expenses that accompany Hudson
notices are audited, the auditor does not express a legal opinion as
to which expenses are chargeable and which are not; the auditor’s
function is limited to “ensur[ing] that the expenditures which the
union claims it made for certain expenses were actually made for
183
those expenses.” The union’s view of the scope of its chargeable
expenses, according to the Court, “is so expansive that it is hard to
184
place much reliance on its statistics.” If the Court were to accept
the union’s definition of chargeability, “it would effectively
eviscerate the limitation on the use of compulsory fees to support
185
unions’ controversial political activities.”
3.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinions

Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, concurring in the judgment,
agreed that a second Hudson notice and opportunity to opt out are
necessary when a public-sector union imposes a special assessment
to fund its political activity. However, Sotomayor took the majority
to task on its decision to institute an opt-in system for political
expenditures. The majority, according to Sotomayor, “proceeds,
quite unnecessarily, to reach significant constitutional issues not
186
contained in the questions presented, briefed, or argued,” which
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2294 (alteration in original) (quoting Andrews v. Educ. Ass’n of
Cheshire, 829 F.2d 335, 340 (2d Cir. 1987)).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2295.
186. Id. at 2297 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The petitioners presented the
following questions:
1. . . . May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
condition employment on the payment of a special union assessment
intended solely for political purposes—a statewide ballot initiative
campaign—without first providing a Hudson notice that includes
information about that assessment and provides an opportunity to opt out of
supporting those political exactions?
2. . . . May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
condition continued public employment on the payment of agency fees
for purposes of financing a union’s opposition to public ballot initiatives?
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 154, at i (emphasis added). The respondent
presented the following questions:
1. If a public employee union has already issued an annual Hudson notice
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187

violates the Court’s own rules. The question of whether an opt-in
system for nonchargeable expenses is constitutionally necessary was
188
not one that either party raised in its briefs or arguments.
With
respect to such a constitutionally significant question,
[t]he imperative of judicial restraint is at its zenith
here . . . for “[i]f there is one doctrine more deeply
rooted than any other in the process of constitutional
adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions
of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is
189
unavoidable.”
Furthermore, the Court’s holding—that “when a public-sector
union imposes a special assessment or dues increase, the union
must provide a fresh Hudson notice and may not exact any funds
190
from nonmembers without their affirmative consent” —raised
191
more questions than it answered, and introduced a great deal of
establishing an objector fee based upon its auditor-verified expenditures
in the preceding year, must the union, when instituting a temporary
increase in membership dues that will not change the objector fee rate,
issue a supplemental notice that predicts how the funds generated by the
increase will be used, establishes a new objector fee rate solely for the
increase based upon those predictions, and provides nonmembers with a
separate opportunity to object to paying the predicted nonchargeable
portion of the increase?
2. (a) Can nonmembers of a public employee union pursue in this Court
a chargeability challenge to the union’s spending to oppose a ballot
initiative, where they disavowed and never litigated such a claim below,
where the decision below did not decide such a claim, and where there is
no evidence that objectors’ fees were spent to support the union’s
opposition to the initiative?
(b) If so, is a public employee union’s opposition to a ballot initiative
that would give a state’s governor the power to abrogate the union’s
collective bargaining agreements sufficiently related to “contract . . .
implementation[]” . . . that the costs of that opposition are chargeable to
all nonmembers?
Brief for Respondent, supra note 148, at i–ii (first ommission in original)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
187. See SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a) (“Only the questions set out in the petition, or
fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court.”).
188. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 154; Brief for Respondent, supra note
148.
189. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2298 (alterations in original) (quoting Clinton v.
Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 690 n.11 (1997)).
190. Id. at 2296 (majority opinion).
191. Id. at 2298–99 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor asked,
Must a union undertaking a special assessment or dues increase obtain
affirmative consent to collect ‘any funds’ or solely to collect funds for
nonchargeable expenses? May a nonmember opt not to contribute to a
special assessment, even if the assessment is levied to fund uncontestably
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uncertainty in an area of law that had been settled for some time.
Justice Sotomayor also criticized the majority for backing away
from longstanding precedent that placed the burden of objecting
192
on the dissenting nonmember.
“To cast serious doubt on
longstanding precedent is a step we historically take only with the
193
greatest caution and reticence.”
The majority’s decision to step
away from a long-settled issue, without affording the parties the
opportunity to brief and argue the issue was “both unfair and
194
unwise.”
“Not content with our task, prescribed by Article III, of
answering constitutional questions,” Sotomayor concluded, “the
195
majority today decides to ask them as well.”
Justices Breyer and Kagan dissented, criticizing the majority’s
departure
from
Hudson’s
framework
for
“developing
administratively workable systems that (1) allow unions to pay the
costs of fulfilling their representational obligations to both
members and nonmembers alike, while (2) simultaneously
protecting the nonmembers’ constitutional right not to support
ideological causes not germane to [the union’s] duties as collective196
bargaining agent.”
Focusing on the practical ramifications of the majority’s
approach, the dissent disapproved of the Court’s willingness to
depart from Hudson’s framework, upon which unions and
197
employers have relied for twenty-five years. The dissent conceded
that the Hudson approach—which bases one year’s chargeable
expenses on the previous year’s expenditures and can vary
198
significantly from year to year—is imperfect.
Still, such an
199
approach “enjoys an offsetting administrative virtue.”
Because
the present year’s dues are based upon the prior year’s audited
chargeable activities? Does the majority’s new rule allow for any
distinction between nonmembers who had earlier objected to the
payment of nonchargeable expenses and those who had not? What
procedures govern this new world of fee collection?
Id.
192. Id. at 2299. Justice Sotomayor specifically criticized the majority for
casting aside the Court’s “explicit holding” in International Association of Machinists
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) as “nothing but an ‘offhand remark.’” Knox, 132 S.
Ct. at 2299.
193. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2299.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2300 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 2301.
199. Id.
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expenses, nonmembers receive a level of certainty that they would
not have if the union were required to make predictions about the
200
coming year’s expenses instead. And while nonmembers will pay
more in some years and less in others, “what [they] lose on the
201
swings they will gain on the roundabouts.”
As to the requirement that the union give a fresh Hudson
notice when it increases dues mid-year, the dissent conceded that
the opportunity to opt out is a greater concern for nonmembers
who did not opt out after the first Hudson notice because they will
202
not have an opportunity to withhold any amount of the increase.
Nevertheless, the dissent maintained, requiring the union to issue a
new notice is administratively unworkable and not required by the
203
Constitution.
Hudson’s annual notice approach is imperfect,
“[b]ut for constitutional purposes the critical fact is that annual
objection is at least one reasonably practical way to permit the
principled objector to avoid paying for politics with which he
204
disagrees.”
The dissent also rejected the majority’s position that an opt-in
system is necessary to protect objecting nonmembers’ First
205
Amendment rights.
The dissent agreed with Justice Sotomayor
that the majority improperly decided a question that had not been
206
presented to the Court, but the dissent further explained that an
opt-in system primarily protects those “who do not feel strongly
enough about the union’s politics to indicate a choice either
207
way.”
These nonmembers may not care enough to opt in, but
also would not have opted out. Thus, the opt-in system has the
potential to significantly reduce the union’s ability to raise funds
for political activity while primarily protecting the First
Amendment rights of nonmembers who don’t care enough to
208
assert them. As the Court held in Davenport, states may choose to

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2304.
203. “[I]nsofar as a new objection permits the new objector to withhold only
the portion of the fee that will pay for nonchargeable expenses . . . unions,
arbitrators, and courts will have to determine, on the basis of a prediction, how
much of the special assessment the new objector can withhold.” Id. at 2305.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 2306.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2307.
208. Id.
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impose an opt-in requirement on their public-sector unions, but
the Supreme Court has never mandated it. “There is no good
reason for the Court suddenly to enter the debate” over opt-in
requirements, Justice Breyer wrote, “much less now to decide that
210
the Constitution resolves it.”
4.

Analysis

The Supreme Court’s decision in Knox is a breathtaking
211
display of judicial activism by the far-right wing of the Court,
which calls into question the future of public-sector unionism in
the United States. Four features of this decision in particular
should give advocates for workplace fairness great cause for
concern.
212
to
First, the Court abandoned fifty years of precedent
unilaterally impose an opt-in system for mid-year changes to
political dues and fees, even though neither party asked the Court
to reach that question, and neither party had an opportunity to
brief and argue the issue. The Court dismissed as dicta the
213
“explicit holding”
from Street, that “dissent is not to be
presumed—it must affirmatively be made known to the union by
214
the dissenting employee.”
Since Street, the Court had continued
215
to apply this requirement throughout its subsequent cases, a
principle commonly known as stare decisis, but which the majority,
216
in this case, called “a historical accident.”
By moving away from long-settled principles of labor law, the
Court injected a great deal of uncertainty into the law that will
217
likely invite future litigation.
The effect of the Court’s holding
209. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177 (2007).
210. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2307.
211. A New York Times editorial called the decision “one of the most brazen of
the Roberts [C]ourt.” Editorial, The Anti-Union Roberts Court, N.Y. TIMES,
June 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/the-anti-union
-roberts-court.html.
212. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
213. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2299 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
214. Street, 367 U.S. at 774.
215. See Chi. Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986);
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
216. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2290 (majority opinion).
217. William Gould, Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board from
1994 to 1998, said, “The Court’s opinion makes clear its displeasure with [sixty]
years of precedent on the dues issue, which have placed the burden on employees
who object [to political spending] to opt out . . . . This decision is an invitation to
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(“[W]hen a public-sector union imposes a special assessment or
dues increase, the union must provide a fresh Hudson notice and
may not exact any funds from nonmembers without their
218
affirmative consent” ) is to raise more questions than it settles.
Does the opt-in procedure apply to every dues increase, or only to
mid-year increases? If a nonmember objects for the first time
following a mid-year increase, how will the chargeable portion be
calculated? Will the union have to estimate its coming year’s
expenses? How will such estimates and expenses be audited? Must
the union issue a refund, or may it collect on an underpayment, if
its projections later proved to be inaccurate? Because the Court
reached questions in its holding that the parties did not brief or
argue, the parties lost an opportunity to weigh in on how the Court
should answer these practical administrative questions.
The Court’s holding in Knox also calls into question the
viability of Street’s holding, which requires a showing of affirmative
dissent from nonmembers. It is not clear whether the Court
intended to overrule Street, but the Court’s holding in Knox leaves
the door wide open to impose Knox’s holding on private-sector
unions as well. To make dissent the default position would seem to
upset the balance the Court struck in Street between the right of
dissenting nonmembers to avoid supporting union speech and the
right of the majority of the members to speak collectively on
matters of political importance. Knox’s holding tips the balance in
favor of dissenters.
Second, the Court circumvented the democratic process to
impose court-made law in an area that has traditionally been left to
the states. Congress left the regulation of labor relations with state
219
employees to the states. States have been free to experiment with
various labor relations systems and laws, and the Court has
protected such experimentation. In Davenport, for example, the
Court held that a state may pass a law requiring that nonmembers

litigate this issue.” Cole Stangler, Supreme Court Union Ruling, Knox v. SEIU, Could
Cut Back Labor’s Political Speech, THE HUFFINGTON POST, (June 25, 2012
7:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/25/supreme-court-unions
-knox-v-seiu_n_1625659.html.
218. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2296.
219. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006); see also Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n,
551 U.S. 177, 186 (2007) (“[O]ur repeated affirmation that courts have an
obligation to interfere with a union’s statutory entitlement no more than is
necessary to vindicate the rights of nonmembers does not imply that legislatures
(or voters) themselves cannot limit the scope of that entitlement.”).
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be required to opt in to, rather than permitted to opt out of, dues
220
Now, however, the Court, on its
levied for political purposes.
own initiative, converted that permissive regulation to a mandatory
one for all states. This is especially troubling in light of the fact
that Proposition 75, which would have required unions to obtain
members’ affirmative consent before charging them dues and fees
to be used for political purposes, was defeated by California
221
voters.
Thus, the Supreme Court imposed a regime that voters
rejected.
Furthermore, California law also permits some political
222
expenditures to be counted as chargeable expenses. In that state,
chargeable expenses may include “the costs of support of lobbying
activities designed to foster policy goals and collective negotiations
and contract administration, or to secure for the employees
represented advantages in wages, hours, and other conditions of
employment in addition to those secured through meeting and
223
conferring with the state employer.”
California’s law appears to
recognize that, in order to be effective at the bargaining table,
unions of public-sector workers must also engage in political
activity to persuade lawmakers to support the union’s negotiating
positions. Without engaging in some political activity, unions of
public workers cannot effectively represent the members’ best
224
interests at the bargaining table.
Not only does the Court’s
holding in Knox call into question the viability of California’s law
without affording the state an opportunity to defend it, it also
ignores the benefit of some political activity to both members and
nonmembers in the collective bargaining process.
This is
particularly troubling because unions have a duty to represent the

220. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 178.
221. See Proposition 75, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CAL. EDUC. FUND (Jan. 28,
2006, 2:49 PM), http://www.smartvoter.org/2005/11/08/ca/state/prop/75/.
222. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3515.8 (West 2010).
223. Id.
224. See Rafael Gely, Ramona L. Paetzold & Leonard Bierman, Educating the
United States Supreme Court at Summers’ School: A Lesson on the “Special Character of the
Animal,” 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 93, 117 (2010) (“[U]nion representation in
the public sector is based on the understanding that the collective bargaining
process represents only one component of the relationship between the public
employee and the public employer. . . . In the public sector . . . collective
bargaining duties related to conditions of employment cannot readily be seen as
distinct from a union’s political activities. . . . [P]ublic policies that make it harder
for public sector unions to engage in political activities also, in turn, make it
harder for them to fulfill the full panoply of their bargaining responsibilities.”).
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interests of members and nonmembers alike. Limiting the unions’
ability to engage with the decision makers on the other side of the
bargaining table hamstrings the unions in the fulfillment of that
duty.
Third, the Court hinted unsubtly that a judicially-created
nationwide “right-to-work” scheme—at least for public-sector
225
unions, if not all unions—may be on its agenda.
The Court
226
noted that union dues constitute a “significant impingement” on
First Amendment rights, and that while “[o]ur cases to date have
tolerated this ‘impingement’ . . . we do not revisit today whether
the Court’s former cases have given adequate recognition to the
227
critical First Amendment rights at stake” —foreboding dicta that
suggests that the Court is inviting further challenges to laws that
allow unions to collect agency fees from nonmembers. Indeed, the
Knox decision “all but begs right-wing advocacy groups and public
employers to use [the Court’s] emerging First-Amendment
jurisprudence to take down public-employee unions and in essence
228
find a Southern-style ‘right-to-work’ law in the Constitution.”
The Court has even conveniently foreshadowed the logical
path it could take in order to arrive at its answer to the “right-towork” question. First, it blurs the critical distinction between dues
used for politics and dues used for collective bargaining, a
229
distinction the Court itself drew in Abood. Dues collected for any
purpose, according to the Court in Knox, constitute a form of
compelled speech and represent “a significant impingement on
230
First Amendment rights.” Because a public-sector union bargains
collectively with politically accountable officials, that bargaining
231
itself has “powerful political and civic consequences.” In essence,
the Court equated public-sector collective bargaining with political
activity simply because the employer is a governmental entity.
Then, from this position, it is a very short leap to requiring that all
225. The National Labor Relations Act permits states to enact “right-to-work”
laws covering the private-sector workforce. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2006). Because
states regulate their own public-sector labor relations, each state chooses whether
its public-employment system will be a “right-to-work” system or an agency-shop
system.
226. Knox v. Serv. Emp. Int’l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2289 (2012).
227. Id.
228. Garrett Epps, The Court’s Scott Walker Moment, AM. PROSPECT (June 21,
2012), http://prospect.org/article/court%E2%80%99s-scott-walker-moment.
229. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 229–31 (1977).
230. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289.
231. Id.
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public-sector employment be “right-to-work.”
After all, if all
public-sector collective bargaining is political, and unions may not
compel nonmembers to pay dues for political purposes, then
unions may not compel nonmembers to pay any dues at all. This is
the essence of the “right-to-work” model: nonmembers cannot be
compelled to pay any dues, even to support the union’s collective
bargaining efforts, which benefit all the employees covered by the
contract.
233
Finally, the Court cited in passing, but largely ignored, the
most troublesome precedent with which it should have grappled:
234
Citizens United. In fact, the disconnect between Citizens United and
Knox and its predecessors may be the most disturbing feature of
this case. While the key holding in Citizens United—that the First
Amendment does not permit political speech restrictions based on
235
the speaker’s identity —purports to place unions and
corporations on equal footing insofar as political spending is
concerned, Knox undermines that supposed equality in three key
ways.
First, while Citizens United rejected onerous administrative
requirements for corporate speakers, Knox further entrenches such
requirements for unions. The Court in Citizens United found that
forcing corporations to conduct their political speech through

232. Acknowledging the inherently political nature of public-sector collective
bargaining does not compel the conclusion that unionization is inappropriate in
the public sector, which seems to be the direction in which the Court is headed.
Indeed, Professor Summers reaches the opposite conclusion when examining the
special character of public-sector collective bargaining, which he calls a “properly
and inevitably political” act. Summers, Bargaining in the Government’s Business,
supra note 31, at 266. Robust unions are necessary to protect the interests of
public workers, he argues; “one of the principal justifications for public-employee
bargaining is that most public employees need this special process to give them an
ability to counteract the overriding political strength of other voters who
constantly press for lower taxes and increased services.” Summers, Problems of
Governmental Decisionmaking, supra note 31, at 675. “Right-to-work” schemes
weaken unions and make it more difficult for them to bargain effectively on behalf
of their members. See generally Michael M. Oswalt, The Grand Bargain: Revitalizing
Labor Through NLRA Reform and Radical Workplace Relations, 57 DUKE L.J. 691
(2007).
233. “Public-sector unions have the right under the First Amendment to
express their views on political and social issues without government interference.”
Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2295 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010)). This is the only reference to Citizens United in the Court’s
opinion.
234. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
235. Id. at 903.
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political action committees (“PACs”), with all the attendant
reporting and recordkeeping requirements, represented a
“burdensome alternative[]” to direct speech and was impermissible
236
under the First Amendment.
Analogously, then, “it should be
true that unions, as associations, have significant First Amendment
interests themselves, and that imposing excessive procedural or
compliance burdens on union speech can amount to a First
237
Amendment violation.” For unions, however, the recordkeeping
and reporting requirements under Hudson and other statutory
provisions are even more burdensome than those demanded of
238
PACs.
Knox not only left those administrative burdens in place
for unions, it increased them by requiring unions to identify which
nonmembers wish to opt in to support a union’s political
239
program.
The Court in Knox did not acknowledge this lopsided
240
scheme, much less attempt to justify it.
Second, as the Court noted in Citizens United, “[s]peech
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often
241
simply a means to control content.”
Making it easier for
corporations to spend money on political speech, while making it
harder for unions to do the same, will create the predictable result
242
of over-representing corporate interests in the public discourse.
236. Id. at 897.
237. Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and Citizens United: The Future of Labor
Speech Rights?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 41 (2011).
238. See id., at 14 (“[U]nions’ uses of dues and fees for political purposes are
encumbered even beyond [campaign finance law’s] independent expenditure
provision. For example, unions are not permitted to use for political purposes
dues and fees submitted by members who object to such use, and they must
publicly disclose many of their expenditures and receipts pursuant to the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. This means that even if unions are
excused from the segregation and reporting requirements that election law
imposes, they must nonetheless carefully track their spending and ensure that only
authorized funds go toward political activities.”) (citations omitted)). These optout requirements apply to both private-sector and public-sector workers.
Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), created opt-out
requirements for private-sector unions substantially similar to Hudson’s
requirements for public-sector workers.
239. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2293 (2012).
240. See Garden, supra note 237, at 43–44 (“At minimum, before imposing
requirements designed to protect objectors in public . . . employment, courts
should ensure that the requirements are narrowly tailored and that they will be,
on balance, sufficiently effective to justify the burden on unions’ political
speech.”).
241. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899.
242. Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After
Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 861–62 (2012).
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By erecting greater roadblocks to unions’ political speech, Knox
increases the opportunities for corporate voices to drown out
workers’ voices in the marketplace of ideas. This content-based
243
disparity makes this distinction constitutionally suspect.
Third, while Knox mandated an opt-in scheme for objecting
nonmembers in public-sector unions, corporate shareholders who
object to their companies’ political spending under Citizens United
244
are not afforded a similar right to opt out of those expenditures.
Thus, corporations may spend freely the proportionate shares of
the residual claimants’ interests in the corporation without their
245
consent, but public-sector unions must now ask permission of
246
every member before collecting dues money for political speech.
The problem with this asymmetry between shareholder rights and
objecting nonmember rights is that it “provide[s] corporations a
legally constructed advantage over unions when it comes to
247
political spending,” which is inconsistent with federal campaign
finance law’s insistence that unions and corporations be put “on
exactly the same basis, insofar as their financial activities are
248
concerned.” The Court’s admonition in Knox that “[t]he general
rule—individuals should not be compelled to subsidize private
249
groups or private speech—should prevail” seems only to apply to
dissenting nonmembers and not to dissenting shareholders.
In sum, Knox is in many ways incompatible with Citizens United,
250
a disconnect that the Court functionally ignored.
Although the
Knox Court cited Citizens United for the proposition that “[p]ublicsector unions have the right under the First Amendment to express
their views on political and social issues without government
interference,” this obscures the complicated and thorny First
251
Amendment issues that both cases raise.
243. Id. at 862.
244. For a thorough examination of the problems with the asymmetry
between shareholders’ rights and objecting nonmembers’ rights, see id.
245. Id. at 825.
246. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2293 (2012).
247. Sachs, supra note 242, at 803.
248. Id. (quoting United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 579 (1957)).
249. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2295.
250. See generally Jeremy G. Mallory, Still Other People’s Money: Reconciling
Citizens United with Abood and Beck, 47 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 32 (2010) (arguing that
“no principled distinction exists that would prevent the cross-application” of the
union dues precedents in the corporate speech context).
251. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2295 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Knox seems to
signal open season on workers and their unions, workers and voters
are fighting back. Indeed, popular support for pro-union laws
remains strong, and where anti-union measures have been put
directly to voters, those measures have frequently been rejected. In
California, for instance, where the Knox case originated, voters
recently defeated Proposition 32, a measure that, like the Idaho law
at issue in Ysursa, would have barred both public- and private-sector
unions from collecting dues for political purposes through
252
employee payroll deductions.
Voters in Ohio also soundly defeated SB 5, a Wisconsin-style
measure pushed by Governor John Kasich that would have
curtailed public employees’ collective-bargaining rights, eliminated
the right to strike, and scrapped binding arbitration of labor253
management disputes.
By a margin of 61–39%, voters in that
state turned back the anti-union overreaching by Governor
254
Kasich; because of his support of SB 5, the Governor’s approval
255
ratings sank to 38% in the months leading up to the election.
Even in Michigan, where the Republican-dominated lameduck legislature and Republican governor hastily pushed through a
“right-to-work” law before the end of the 2012 term, only 41
256
percent of Michiganders support right-to-work legislation.
With
the election of several more Democrats to the state legislature,

252. Proposition 32, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CAL. EDUC. FUND (Dec. 17,
2012, 1:48 PM), http://www.smartvoter.org/2012/11/06/ca/state/prop/32/; see
also Proposition 32: Prohibits Political Contributions by Payroll Deduction, CAL. LEGIS.
ANALYST’S OFF. (July 18, 2012), http://lao.ca.gov/ballot/2012/32_11_2012.pdf.
The proposition would also have banned payroll deductions for political
expenditures by corporations, but according to the Legislative Analyst’s Office,
“[o]ther than unions, relatively few organizations currently use payroll deductions
to finance political spending in California.” Id. at 3. That provision, then, would
have been essentially meaningless.
253. Amanda Terkel & John Celock, Ohio Issue 2: Controversial Anti-Union Law
Defeated by Voters, HUFFINGTON POST, (Nov. 9, 2011, 12:38 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/08/ohio-issue-2-_n_1083100.html.
254. Id.
255. Joe Vardon, Kasich Can Count Big Wins, SB 5 Loss in First Year, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Dec. 18, 2011, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011
/12/18/kasich-can-count-big-wins-sb-5-loss-in-first-year.html.
256. Tom Jensen, Snyder’s Popularity Plummets, PUB. POL’Y POLLING
(Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/main/2012/12/snyders
-popularity-plummets.html.
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257

right-to-work legislation would have failed in the next session.
And with such low support among the public, it likely would have
been defeated if put to a popular vote. Perhaps for that reason,
supporters of the legislation tied the right-to-work language to an
appropriations bill, eliminating the possibility that it could be
258
overturned by referendum.
Workers in the cradle of the
American labor movement, however, are not rolling over. One
lawsuit has already been filed to challenge the law, and labor is
mulling its other options, including political as well as legal
259
strategies.
As workers beat back anti-union initiatives from right-wing
lawmakers at the state level, there is also hope at the federal level.
In the next four years, President Obama may have the opportunity
260
to replace more than one member of the Supreme Court; a
moderate majority could help to stem the tide of anti-union
decisions coming out of the Court. For public-sector workers in
particular, the stakes have never been higher.

257. Josh Hicks, Did Michigan Lawmakers Ram Through ‘Right to Work’ Laws?,
WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact
-checker/post/did-michigan-lawmakers-ram-through-right-to-work-laws/2012/12
/19/a87d8e60-47c9-11e2-b6f0-e851e741d196_blog.html.
258. Chad Livengood & Karen Bouffard, Snyder Makes Michigan 24th Right-toWork State, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 11, 2012, http://www.detroitnews.com/article
/20121211/POLITICS02/212110393.
259. Amanda Terkel, Right to Work in Michigan: Labor’s Options for Repeal,
HUFFINGTON POST, (Dec. 11, 2012, 4:13 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2012/12/11/right-to-work-michigan_n_2277178.html; see also Jim Lynch,
Lawsuits Expected over Right to Work, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 20, 2012, http://
www.detroitnews.com/article/20121220/POLITICS02/212200365.
260. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Future of an Aging Court Raises Stakes of Presidential
Vote, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/us
/presidential-election-could-reshape-an-aging-supreme-court.html. There are now
four justices—Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsberg, and Breyer—over the age of 74.
Id. The average retirement age for Supreme Court justices is 78.7. Id.
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